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UNITED STATES-CHINA--Consular Convention with the People's Republic of China, Report (to accompany Treaty Doc. No. 97-3) (Sen. Exec. Rpt.

No. 97-14), 1981. (KJ185.U5b)
EARL WEISBAUM

Extra-territorial Application to U.S.
Export Control Laws on Foreign
Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations:
An American Lawyer's View
from Europe
1. Introduction
The subject of extra-territorial application of national laws (especially
U.S. laws) has received considerable attention in the press and in legal publications in recent years, particularly since the recent enactment of so-called
"blocking legislation" in a number of countries.' The main focus of attention has been the transborder application of U.S. antitrust laws, with
respect to both government and private actions. Other U.S. laws in areas
such as export controls, foreign boycotts, and securities regulations have
also been the target of criticism by other nations because of their extraterritorial reach. The pros and cons of the U.S. position have been extensively
debated on both sides of the Atlantic over the past years. The debate has at
least served to improve the understanding of a rather esoteric subject, and
may have contributed to a more moderate approach in recent U.S. legislative and regulatory actions. However, as will be demonstrated later, such
moderation is sometimes more apparent than real. The purpose of this article is not to present yet another general overview of this subject. Rather, it
is to focus on the effects which the extra-territorial of U.S. export-related
laws may have on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations,
and to suggest that the attempts by the U.S. government to impose its laws
on economic activities outside of its borders are of dubious value to the
implementation of domestic and foreign policy goals, are clearly harmful to
the interests of the U.S. corporations involved, and are often, in practical
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author, and are not intended to reflect
the views of anyone else. This article was written prior to the recent imposition of sanctions by
the U.S. Government against Dresser Industries' French subsidiary in connection with the
European gas pipeline project, a dramatic example of some of the issues discussed herein.
'Eg., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 (United Kingdom).
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effect, against the U.S. national interest. It is admittedly difficult to quantify the negative effects, but obviously in these troubled times we should
avoid any actions which even marginally reduce the competitiveness of
U.S. corporations in the world market, particularly if they also harm the
foreign relations of the United States, without at the same time producing
compensating material benefits.
2. Applicability of U.S. Export Controls to Foreign Subsidiaries
One of the principal aspects of the extra-territoriality issue is the applicability of certain U.S. laws and regulations to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies. This is commonly done in the export control area by defining
the covered U.S. persons as including controlled foreign subsidiaries.
Under regulations of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the foreign subsidiary may be affected even if there is no U.S. connection other than the2
subsidiary's direct or indirect ownership by a U.S. person or legal entity.
Often, however, the application of the U.S. law is also based on some
involvement with the foreign commerce of the United States, as in the case
of the anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act. 3 But in
contrast, under the anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 19764
(whose intended effect is extra-territorial in the sense that the U.S. parent
will be expected to put pressure on the foreign subsidiary in order to avoid
adverse U.S. tax consequences), a 10 percent share ownership in a foreign
company may be sufficient for that law to apply.
The complex reexport sections of the Export Administration Regulations
are of particular significance to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, as
they purport to control rigorously the destiny of U.S. origin end products
and components once they have been exported from U.S. territory 5 and
also to regulate the export or reexport of certain foreign produced direct
products of U.S. technical data, and even commodities which are produced
abroad by a "plant or major component thereof which is a direct product of
U.S. technical data."'6 These rules are worth examining, since they are a
striking example of the U.S. government's attempt to control the activities
of foreign persons outside the United States.
Section 374.1 of the Export Administration Regulations, entitled "Prohibited Exports and Reexports," includes the following language:
Unless the reexport of a commodity previously exported from the United States
has been specifically authorized in writing by the Office of Export Administration

prior to its reexport, or is authorized under the permissive reexport provisions of
Section 374.2, or is otherwise authorized under any other provision of the Export
2
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 500; Transaction Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. Part 505; Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515.
U.S.C. app. § 2408 (supp. III 1979).
150
4
I.R.C. § 999.
5
Eg., 15 C.F.R. § 374.1 and 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1981).
'15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1981).
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Administration Regulations, no person in aforeign country (including Canada), or

in the United States may:

a) Reexport such commodity directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from the
authorized country(ies) of ultimate destination;...
(Emphasis added)

This prohibition applies to all "persons"-not just to U.S. citizens or
U.S.-controlled foreign entities. Once a commodity is sold to a foreign person in a foreign country, one would normally assume that whatever happens to that commodity thereafter lies solely within the jurisdiction of the
foreign country. It has simply become an asset of that foreign country. To
attempt to control the reexportation of the commodity on grounds of U.S.
national security stretches the "effects" doctrine (the only conceivable justification under international law for such control) to an absurd length: what
would then prevent a nation from seeking to control any activity in a foreign country on the grounds that its security is affected?
Nobody would question the right of the U.S. government to control the
destination and use of strategic commodities at the time of exportationfrom
the United States, but once the commodities have been exported, any further attempt at such control should be handled on a government-to-government basis (through COCOM, for example), and not through a highly
questionable application of U.S. law. Moreover, the reexport provisions of
the Export Administration Regulations must as a practical matter be virtually unenforceable, and are probably largely ignored outside the United
States--except of course when the reexporting company is a subsidiary of a
U.S. company.
The reaction of European governments towards the extra-territorial
reach of U.S. laws is on the whole negative, but the individual characteristics of foreign subsidiaries may influence a host country's attitude towards
particular applications of U.S. laws. For example:
i) A U.S. company operates a sales subsidiary in a European country,
with no manufacturing activity and usually with few employees. The
subsidiary may have a local board of directors, but it is clear that the
company is merely a sales arm of the parent. The economic and social
interest in such a subsidiary from the host country point of view will
usually be minor, and its subjection to U.S. antitrust laws and export
controls should not raise serious problems.
ii) A U.S. company establishes a 100 percent-owned manufacturing subsidiary in Europe, to produce its U.S.-designed products. The host
country interest will obviously be greater, but again, the application of
U.S. laws such as export controls to what is in effect a foreign manufacturing arm of the U.S. parent could be viewed with some tolerance by
the host country. However, this tolerance may be slight or nonexistent
when a substantial number of jobs is at stake, and when the subsidiary
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is a significant factor in the local economy. 7
iii) A U.S. company acquires the shares of a foreign company, whose products and technology are basically of non-U.S. origin. Large numbers of
such companies in Europe have come under U.S. control mainly since
World War II, and they raise the most difficult problems in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. Very often their management is
entirely European, and sometimes they are important suppliers to their
governments in defense and other areas. For the U.S. government to
seek to apply its policies and laws to such "national" economic entities
is particularly difficult to justify.
The above analysis would seem to cast doubt on the too simplistic proposition that mere U.S. ownership of a foreign company makes it essentially
"American" and properly subject to U.S. laws and policies.
3. The Consequences
Some of the reactions which the U.S. policy on extra-territoriality has
generated from certain foreign governments are well-known, particularly
the enactment of blocking legislation, designed specifically to prevent local
subsidiaries of U.S. companies from complying with U.S. directives in certain cases. There are other less visible consequences of the U.S. approach
which should not be ignored.
One such consequence, which is surely not in the interest of the United
States, is to make it more difficult for U.S. companies to acquire foreign
companies. It is not unreasonable to assume that the long arm of U.S.
export controls may have contributed to the French government's restrictive policy towards take-overs of French companies by U.S. corporations.
An interesting recent case in the U.K. involved the iegative recommendation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on Enserch Corporation's
bid to acquire Davy Corporation Ltd.8 One of the grounds for the Commission's conclusion was the possible detrimental effects of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act on Davy's business in certain countries. The Commission also examined the potential effects of the Export Administration
Act, but concluded that in this case the effects would be limited. The report
of the Commission contains the following significant statement as to the
British government's attitude:
The Department [of Trade] also explained that the United Kingdom Government
does not accept the view that the nationality of the shareholders in a body corporate founds a claim to jurisdiction over the body corporate itself. Difficulties have
arisen for United Kingdom companies from the view of the United States authorities that for the purposes of certain United States laws the United States of
7

Eg., the Fruehauf case, Judgment of May 22, 1965, Cour d'Appel, Paris [1968] DallozSirey, Jurisprudence 147.
'The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Report on the Proposed Merger of Enserch
Corporation and Davy Corporation Limited (September 1981-H.M. Stationery Office).

734

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

America has jurisdiction over companies incorporated in the United Kingdom
and doing business there simply by reason of the United States nationality of
shareholders in those companies. These have given rise to discussions with the
United States authorities since the United Kingdom Government does not accept
the application of United States laws to United Kingdom companies by virtue of
such claims of extra-territorial jurisdiction. Powers to protect United Kingdom
companies in these circumstances are among those contained in the Protection of
Trading Interests Act 1980 and, in support of diplomatic pressure, the powers
would be available in appropriate cases (for example where, as in the anti-boycott
laws, the application of United States law depends on a requirement for companies to report particular activities). Some difficulties have been overcome after
representations to the United States of America and over the years the number of
major problems coming to the Department's attention has been small, although
there are many companies in the United Kingdom with United States shareholdings. United Kingdom companies may, however, feel inhibited in aspects of trading by reason the United States shareholdings in them in ways which have not
come to the Department's attention and the United States authorities are clearly
parents on their whollyin a position to exert influence through United States
9
owned or controlled United Kingdom subsidiaries.
The reference in the last sentence of the statement to "influence through
U.S. parents" highlights one noteworthy aspect of this subject, which can be
described as "indirect extra-territoriality." It is perhaps even more objectionable than the outright assertion of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries,
since the U.S. government attempts to achieve the same result indirectly

while at the same time professing its desire to avoid conflicts with friendly
governments through the exclusion of foreign subsidiaries from the coverage of certain laws and regulations.
An example of "indirect extra-territoriality" is the pressuring of the U.S.
parent by the U.S. government (the pressure sometimes involves the threat
of unfavorable publicity through leaks to the press) to compel its foreign
subsidiaries to follow "voluntarily" the U.S. rules. The application of such

pressure may be facilitated by reporting requirements which are imposed
on the U.S. parent regarding transactions by its foreign subsidiaries which
0
are prohibited for U.S. companies but permitted for such subsidiaries.'
Another "indirect" aspect is the applicability of the U.S. laws to officers and
directors of foreign subsidiaries who are U.S. citizens. This presents the

parent company with unpalatable alternatives: either to avoid having any
Americans on the boards of its subsidiaries, or expose them to possible
prosecution if the subsidiary does not follow the U.S. rules. The result may
be that the U.S. parent will seek to compel the subsidiary to apply the U.S.
rules, even though the particular law may exlcude foreign subsidiaries as
such.

Following are other possible consequences of U.S. extra-territoriality on
the policies of foreign governments regarding U.S.-controlled companies:
Vd., 8.12.
'Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.207(b) (1980).
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a) Foreign governments inclined to nationalize private industry, either
through government ownership or by forcing a U.S. parent to sell its
foreign subsidiary to local shareholders, may find the extra-territoriality issue to be an additional justification for this policy.
b) Foreign governments may be less inclined to support the export activities of U.S.-owned subsidiaries, if they feel that their efforts in this
respect may be frustrated by the application of U.S. export control
laws.
c) Foreign governments, which often have a tendency to favor nationally-owned companies in their procurement policies, may find it easier
to justify such discrimination towards foreign-owned entities if they
can point to the influence of foreign legislation on the activities of
these subsidiaries, which in every other respect may have strictly
"local" characteristics.
The extra-territoriality problem can also affect in a negative, if intangible, way the relations between the managements of the foreign subsidiaries
and their U.S. parents. Many European subsidiaries are, as previously
noted, essentially "local" in character. Often there are no Americans in the
management, and to the local public, the subsidiaries are considered
national companies, as the foreign ownership is seldom emphasized or wellknown. The maintenance of this local identity is frequently dictated by
business necessity, and works to the advantage of both the subsidiary and
its American parent. The managers of the local company personify this
legal entity, while at the same time functioning as loyal members of the
corporate family. Consequently, the directives of the parent company
requiring that certain U.S. laws affecting the subsidiary's business be
observed are adhered to, but they can generate considerable resentment and
frustration on the part of the foreign managers, particularly when there is a
negative economic effect on the company. The application of certain laws,
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the anti-boycott provisions,
is particularly difficult for the European managers to swallow, since they
are viewed as purely U.S. domestic political measures, the rationale for
which is often not accepted in the foreign country. Moreover, the European
managers will feel that they are acting at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their
home country competitors, which may affect their morale and motivation.
The foregoing factors are obviously difficult to evaluate, but they undoubtedly can adversely influence the functioning of an international management team.
Another factor to be considered is that the extra-territorial application of
U.S. laws can place the officers and directors of the foreign subsidiaries in a
difficult position in respect of the laws of their own country. Under most
European company laws, the directors are accountable to the shareholders,
but their affirmative duty is to carry out their functions in the best interests
of their company. Any actions which they may take at the direction of the
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controlling shareholders contrary to the interests of the subsidiary could
subject them to civil actions by creditors, employees or minority shareholders, and possibly even to criminal proceedings.
Fortunately, there appear to have been few problems of this kind so far,
even though local managements tend to comply with parent company
directives despite the potential damage to the subsidiary. On occasion,
however, directors of U.S.-controlled subsidiaries have been known to
refuse to comply with demands from their parent to provide information
regarding their companies' activities for submission to U.S. government
agencies, on the grounds that such disclosure could cause serious harm to
their company. It is clear that from a legal point of view, the directors'
refusals were entirely proper. But such incidents are unpleasant and can
place the U.S. parent company management in a difficult situation under
U.S. law. They can only have a harmful effect on the proper functioning of
a multinational corporation. Problems in this area will no doubt arise more
frequently in the future, as the European company law continues to tend
towards emphasizing the social responsibility of management-namely, to
the employees, the unions, the consumers and the national economy as a
whole. It seems inherently improper to force the subsidiary's management
to abandon a particular sale because, for example, the transaction would
violate the U.S. export regulations due to the inclusion of one U.S. component representing an insignificant part of the sale. In a period of increasing
unemployment, the foreign subsidiary's management could be placed in an
untenable position if it refuses job-creating business for such reasons. The
problem is of course aggravated whenever local minority shareholders exist.
4. Conclusion
The well being and development of U.S. foreign investments and commerce should be an important goal of national policy. The extra-territorial
application of U.S. laws to foreign subsidiaries clearly does not help to
achieve this goal--quite the contrary. Such application can be defended on
the grounds that it is required to foster certain other national policies, such
as national security, and also to avoid the circumvention of U.S. laws
through off-shore activities. The latter defense seems weak-it should be
possible to sanction such circumventions through the U.S. parent. One can
also reasonably question whether U.S. export controls in their present form
really contribute to any significant extent to national security. The U.S.
approach to export controls is considered unnecessarily broad by the western Europeans. Indeed, as a recent study by the Rand Corporation reportedly asserts, " export controls, other than those relating to strictly military
applications, may be counter-productive, in that they may force the Soviet
Union to find its own solutions to technological problems, rather than
"International Herald Tribune, August 19, 1981.

